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“An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all.”1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The attorney-client privilege, developed from and governed by common law2 is
considered “the most sacred of all legally recognized privileges, and its preservation is
essential to the just and orderly operation of our legal system.”3 The proper administration of
justice requires scrupulous respect for, and protection of, this privilege to ensure that
individuals feel free to make complete and full disclosure of facts to their lawyers, including
admitting to past crimes and acts of indiscretion.4 To insure its efficacy, the protection granted
by the privilege must be consistent and predictable.5
Without such full disclosure counsel cannot render effective and comprehensive legal
advice. Consequently, though the attorney-client privilege is not absolute, its abrogation should
occur in extremely rare circumstances where a court finds that the privilege holder abused the

1

Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
FED. R. EVID. 501. Eight factors must be satisfied for the common law attorney-client
privilege to attach to communication: the communication must be (1) legal advice sought from
a (2) professional legal advisor (3) where the communication is related to the legal purpose, (4)
and is made in confidence, (5) by the client, and (6) is permanently protected for the client (7)
from disclosure by himself or the legal advisor, (8) unless that protection is waived. John H.
Wigmore, Evidence §2292 at 554 (McHaughton Rev. 1961).
3
United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1997)..
4
Id. at 529
5
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (“An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all.”)
2
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privilege by an established quantum of proof. One such abuse warranting vitiation of the
attorney-client privilege occurs where a client is using his lawyer to commit a crime or fraud.6
The crime-fraud exception, like the attorney-client privilege, is a creature of common
law and applies in both the civil and criminal context.7 Where the exception arises as part of
civil litigation, procedural protections are in place to ensure that the privilege-holder can
meaningfully challenge the adversary’s claim, in open court, before a court orders outright
disclosure of attorney-client communications.8 In contrast, where it arises in criminal litigation,
usually in the context of a grand jury investigation, the privilege-holder has no concomitant
right to be heard; indeed, rarely is he informed of the specific conduct allegedly constituting
crime-fraud nor is he provided the opportunity to rebut the same on papers or in an evidentiary
hearing.9 Instead, a trial judge generally receives ex parte submissions by the government,
often followed by in camera proceedings where the court will review the privileged
communication at issue and determine whether the crime-fraud exception applies. If yes, the
privilege holder’s counsel must testify before the grand jury regarding privileged
communications or risk being held in contempt.10 Without any meaningful opportunity to argue
in defense of preserving the attorney-client privilege, the lawyer’s confidential relationship
with his client is forever abrogated.11

6

See infra Section II.A.
Id. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct also permit disclosure of client
confidences under several scenarios, one of which tracks the crime-fraud exception. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007) (stating in pertinent part that counsel is
permitted to disclose a client’s crime or fraud when it is “reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which
the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.”).
8
See infra Section II.B.
9
Id.
10
See infra Section III.
11
Id.
7
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Examining the procedures surrounding application of the crime-fraud exception—civil
and criminal—raises several pivotal legal questions. First, what quantum of proof is necessary
to invoke the crime-fraud exception, and to what extent does that answer depend upon whether
the privilege-holder is a civil litigant or the subject/target of a grand jury investigation?
Second, what due process protections are in place to ensure that crime-fraud has actually
occurred before a court orders outright disclosure of attorney-client communications, and to
what extent do those protections differ, civil versus criminal? Finally, why do privilege-holders
in criminal cases have significantly fewer procedural protections than civil litigants?
The first section of this paper explores the varying burdens of proof, judicial procedures
and protections that have evolved in connection with the crime-fraud exception over the last 30
years, illustrating the differential treatment between civil and criminal privilege-holders.12 The
federal cases demonstrate a trend toward conferring more due process protections on civil
privilege-holders with no comparable trend toward criminal privilege-holders. The second
section discusses the ramifications to the privilege-holder when a court vitiates the attorneyclient privilege through application of the attorney-client privilege.13 The third section reviews
different ways that federal courts have conferred some procedural protections on privilege
holders in criminal cases while
attempting to balance these protections against the purported need for grand jury
secrecy. 14The final section of this article proposes legislation imposing additional procedural
requirements on the prosecution as the party seeking discovery of privileged attorney-client
communication, and on the court adjudicating the crime-fraud issue, to confer meaningful

12
13
14

See infra Section II.
See infra Section III.
See infra Section IV.
5

procedural protections on the privilege-holder in criminal cases.15 The proposed legislation
addresses the procedures surrounding the presentation of “crime-fraud” evidence to the court,
establishes when notice of the allegations must be provided to the privilege-holder, and
delineates when the affected party may rebut the allegations.16 This legislation will arm the
privilege-holder with due process protections, while respecting the need for secrecy in criminal
investigations.17

15

See infra Section V.
Id.
17
The proposed legislation in this article addresses protection of attorney-client
communications, oral and written, and does not encompass attorney work-product.
16
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II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Quantum of Proof Required to Pierce the Attorney-Client Privilege under the
Crime-Fraud Exception
The Supreme Court first addressed the crime-fraud exception in Clark v. United

States.18 There, a juror neglected to inform the court of her personal and professional
connections with the defendants and committed perjury by assuring the court of her lack of
bias in the matter.19 The Court held that a juror may not invoke the typical protection from
exposure of the “arguments and the ballots of a juror . . . where the relation giving birth to it
has been fraudulently begun or fraudulently continued.”20 The Court analogized to the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, where “the privilege takes flight if the
[attorney-client] relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve
him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be
told.”21 The Court, in dicta,22 then addressed for the first time the evidentiary standard needed
to vitiate the attorney-client privilege through the crime-fraud exception: the moving party
must make a prima facie showing that the crime-fraud has some basis in fact.23 The Court did
not, however, address any distinction between the quantum of proof necessary to pierce the
privilege in civil versus criminal cases.

18

289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
Id. at 8.
20
Id. at 13-14. The Court in Clark focused on the privilege a juror was entitled to in
deliberations. Id. at 8.
21
Id. at 15.
22
Although the Court only speaks of the attorney-client privilege in dicta, Clark is
frequently cited for its discussion of the crime-fraud exception and the prima facie burden of
proof.
23
Clark, 289 U.S. at 15 (“‘It is obvious that it would be absurd to say that the privilege
could be got rid of merely by making a charge of fraud.’ To drive the privilege away, there
must be ‘something to give colour [sic] to the charge’; there must be ‘prima facie evidence that
it has some foundation in fact.’”) (quoting O’Rourke v. Darbishire, A.C. 581, 604 (1920)).
19
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In 1989, the Supreme Court in United States v. Zolin again confronted the crime-fraud
exception.24 This time, the Court focused on a narrower issue: whether a party seeking to
pierce the attorney-client privilege by alleging crime-fraud must rely exclusively on evidence
and sources independent of the disputed attorney-client communications, or could instead
request that the trial court review, in camera, the actual privileged communications at issue.25
The Court rejected the independent evidence approach and instead laid out a two-step process
to determine when the crime-fraud exception should be applied.26 First, the moving party must
make a threshold showing, using non-privileged evidence “of ‘a factual basis adequate to
support a good faith belief by a reasonable person’ that in camera review of the materials may
reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”27 Though the
Zolin court did not specify the level of proof necessary to trigger in camera inspection, all
courts that have addressed this issue concur that it is very low.28 Second, the trial judge may
hold an in camera review of the privileged communication itself in the form of documents,

24

491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989).
Id.
26
Id. at 556-557. In selecting this approach, the Court found that in camera review did
not violate any express provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence although the interaction
between Rules 104(a) and 1101(c) seemingly indicated that privileged communication could
not be considered. Id. at 566. The Court instead concluded that Rule 104(a) did not prohibit
reliance on the result of in camera review of privileged communication. Id. at 568.
27
Id. at 572 (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982).
28
Though the level of proof for in camera inspection under Zolin and its progeny is
low, most courts require as part of that proof, some evidence by the moving party that “the
client was engaged in or planning a criminal or fraudulent scheme when it sought the advice of
counsel to further the scheme,” and that the privileged communications are “sufficiently related
to” and were made “in furtherance of [the] intended or present, continuing illegality.” In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v.
Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 540 (9th Cir. 1988) and In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
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attorney testimony, or both. Whether to conduct that extra level of review is left to the “sound
discretion” of the district court.29
The Supreme Court declined to clarify what quantum of proof the moving party must
establish to compel outright disclosure, generally the second step of the two-part Zolin test.30
That decision was made notwithstanding the Court’s acknowledgement that the phrase prima
facie to describe the quantum of proof in Clark caused confusion and still remained “subject to
question.”31 As with Clark the Court made no mention of whether that quantum of proof
should differ depending upon whether the privilege holder was a civil litigant or the subject of
a criminal investigation.
Post–Zolin, most trial courts adhere to some variation of the prima facie standard in
determining whether to pierce the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases.32 They have done

29

Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572. Courts frequently conduct in camera review in criminal
cases rather than ordering outright disclosure of privileged communications based solely on the
threshold showing consisting of nonprivileged material. This extra level of review is not
required under Zolin and its progeny; all that is required to compel disclosure of privileged
communication is a prima facie showing of crime-fraud, although there is much dispute about
what that means. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 565, 572.
30
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563-64. The Court elected to limit its discussion to the type of
evidence needed to warrant application of the crime-fraud exception, rather than the amount.
Id.
31
Id. at 565, fn. 7.
We note . . . that this Court’s use in Clark v. United States . . . of the phrase
“prima facie case” to describe the showing needed to defeat the privilege has
caused some confusion. In using the phrase in Clark, the Court was aware of
scholarly controversy concerning the role of the judge in the decision of such
preliminary questions of fact. The quantum of proof needed to establish
admissibility was then, and remains, subject to question. In light of the narrow
question presented here for review, this case is not the proper occasion to visit
these questions.
Id. (citations omitted).
32
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 660 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating
that prima facie evidence to invoke the crime-fraud exception requires “that the allegation of
attorney participation in the crime or fraud has some foundation in fact.”); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that under the prima facie standard “it is
9

so notwithstanding the Zolin Court’s observation that “the prima facie standard is commonly
used by courts in civil litigation to shift the burden of proof from one party to the other. In the
context of the fraud exception, however, the standard is used to dispel the privilege altogether
without affording the client the opportunity to rebut the prima facie showing.”33 Conversely, in
the civil arena, though some courts have adhered to a prima facie standard, there has been a
noticeable trend toward imposing a higher burden of proof on the party seeking discovery.34
The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires that the moving party in grand jury cases need only
show “reasonable cause to believe” that the privilege holder committed crime-fraud.35 In civil
cases, the same Circuit held that “the burden of proof that must be carried by a party seeking
outright disclosure of attorney-client communications under the crime-fraud exception should
be preponderance of the evidence.”36

enough to overcome the privilege that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the lawyer’s
services were used by the client to foster a crime or fraud.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419
F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that prima facie evidence is “such as will suffice until
contradicted and overcome by other evidence”) (citation omitted); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that prima facie evidence is “evidence
which, if believed by the fact-finder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements
of the crime-fraud exception were met.”) (citation omitted).
33
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565 n.7 (quoting Susan F. Jennison, Note, The Crime or Fraud
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 913, 918-919 (1985) (emphasis
in original)).
34
Circuits across the country differ in their articulation of the required burden of proof
to pierce the privilege. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 479 F.3d 1078, 1082
(9th Cir. 2006) (“when the district court is asked to order outright disclosure, the burden of
proof on the party seeking to vitiate the privilege is preponderance of the evidence”).
35
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
appropriate quantum of proof in a criminal case to demonstrate the crime-fraud exception’s
applicability is “reasonable cause to believe that . . . that the witness-attorney’s legal services
were utilized . . . in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.”).
36
In re Napster, 479 F.3d at 1094-95.
10

B.

Civil v. Criminal Litigants: Procedures when Adjudicating Crime-Fraud and the role of
Due Process
In the civil arena, one party will generally seek discovery of the other party’s attorney-

client communications as part of the adversarial process. Consequently, irrespective of whether
the court adopts a prima facie standard of proof or a higher one, once the moving party makes
the required evidentiary showing, the burden of proof shifts to the privilege holder.37 Both
parties will generally litigate the matter in open court as part of discovery.38 The privilege
holder will have full notice of the crime fraud allegation and a meaningful opportunity to
challenge that claim through an evidentiary hearing.
Conversely, in criminal cases the crime-fraud exception is most commonly invoked in
the context of a grand jury investigation as part of a criminal investigatory process.39 As such,
once the moving party makes a prima facie showing, the attorney-client privilege is dispelled
without any burden shifting.40
In the typical case, the prosecutor presenting a case to an impaneled grand jury will
issue a subpoena to compel a lawyer to testify before that body to his confidential
communications with his client, usually a target or subject.41 Often the evidence sought will
“arise[] from documentary evidence and statements from cooperating witnesses . . . includ[ing]

37

Susan F. Jennison, Note, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 913, 918 (1985).
38
See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett, 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992).
39
In contrast to the adversarial process of a civil trial.
40
See In re Grand Jury, 223 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000).
41
Thomas M. DiBiagio, Federal Criminal Law and the Crime-Fraud Exception:
Disclosure of Privileged Conversations and Documents Should Not be Compelled without the
Government’s Factual Foundation being Tested by the Crucible of Meaningful Adversarial
Testing, 62 MD. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003).
11

testimony before the grand jury and documents produced in response to grand jury
subpoenas.”42
Once the government issues the subpoena on the client-target’s attorney, the attorney or
the privilege-holder as a client-intervenor will generally move to quash, asserting the attorneyclient privilege.43 Almost all federal courts then apply the two-step process established in
Zolin,44 requiring the prosecution to make a threshold showing of a “factual basis adequate to
support a good faith belief by a reasonable person . . . that in camera review of the materials
may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”45 In this
phase, the prosecution will submit nonprivileged evidence ex parte—often including grand
jury materials—to justify in camera review and ultimately the abrogation of the privilege by
compelling the lawyer to testify in the grand jury.46 At this preliminary stage, though
prohibited from reviewing the privileged communication at issue, the court may consider
evidence that is not independent of the allegedly privileged material.47 Once the court finds that

42

DiBiagio, supra note 41, at 1.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Nos. 97-1002, 97-1003), 123 F.3d 695, 696 (1st
Cir. 1997) (where both client and law firm filed separate motions to quash on grounds of
attorney-client privilege). The client owns the privilege, but the attorney may assert the
privilege for the client as well.
44
Additionally, many courts have articulated a two-pronged prima facie test. See, e.g.,
In re Grand Jury Proceeding #5, 401 F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir. 2005) (“(1) the client was engaged
in or planning a criminal or fraudulent scheme when he sought the advice of counsel to further
the scheme, and (2) the documents [or communication] containing the privileged materials bear
a close relationship to the client’s existing or future scheme to commit a crime or fraud.”)
(citation omitted).
45
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989)
46
Though “courts should not interfere with the grand jury process absent compelling
reason,” In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979), they will intervene when
“recognized privilege[] provide legitimate grounds for refusing to comply with a grand jury
subpoena,” In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and the attorney-client
privilege is one such common-law privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceeding #5, 401 F.3d at 250.
43

47

Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574-75.
12

a factual good-faith basis exists, the most common practice is to conduct an in camera review
of evidence presented by the prosecution, which often includes the communications at issue
including written communication between a lawyer and his client. In some circumstances the
court may compel the lawyer to appear in camera to testify to those communications with his
client that allegedly constitute crime-fraud.48 At both the threshold stage and when making its
crime-fraud determination, the trial court may rely on evidence that may not be admissible at
trial.49
Unlike the civil arena, the ex parte in camera review in the grand jury context generally
means that the privilege-holder is denied the opportunity to see the government’s in camera
submission.50 Nor is that privilege-holder informed of the specific conduct allegedly
constituting crime fraud. Although the court has the discretion to provide opposing counsel the
48

The Zolin Court listed several criteria for the trial court to consider when deciding
whether to grant an in camera review: the facts of the case, the circumstances surrounding the
case, the volume of submitted materials, the importance of the allegedly privileged material,
and the likelihood that all available evidence will show that the crime-fraud exception applies.
See id. at 572.
49
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1989) (where
hearsay potentially constituted part of the government’s ex parte submission to the court for in
camera review); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (where the
court reviewed grand jury materials in making a crime-fraud determination); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 842 F.2d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1987 ) (where a prosecutor’s good faith statement
summarizing evidence presented to grand jury sufficed); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 723
F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983) (where documentary evidence or prosecutor’s good faith
statements of grand jury testimony sufficed). See also Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) (stating
in pertinent part that “[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound
by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.”).
50
See In Re John Doe, Inc., 13 F. 3d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1994) (observing that “the
cautionary tone of Zolin with respect to the use of in camera proceedings concerns the
disclosure of the communications for which the privilege is claimed… [but] does not address
the propriety of ex parte submissions of non-privileged materials, [and concluding with a
reference to a previous Second Circuit holding that] “where in camera is the only way to
resolve an issue without compromising a legitimate need to preserve the secrecy of the grand
jury, it is an appropriate procedure.”).
13

opportunity to rebut claims, or to make the proceeding an adversarial one, it rarely does so.51 In
the vast majority of reported cases, courts rule on motions to compel disclosure of attorneyclient communications without notice to the privilege holder, thereby precluding the clienttarget from presenting evidence to defeat the allegations.52
Thus whether the party seeking disclosure of these communications is a civil litigant or
a prosecutor in a criminal action will dictate the extent to which the privilege holder has
meaningful due process protections. In the context of civil litigation, all circuits that have
addressed the issue hold that privilege holders must have notice of the alleged conduct
constituting crime-fraud and must be afforded an opportunity to rebut the claims through an
evidentiary hearing before the court rules on the issue. Several courts have gone so far as to
hold that a denial of that evidentiary hearing is a denial of due process.53 In the context of
grand jury investigations, no court has ruled that the privilege holder has concomitant rights.
While some courts have devised minimal procedural protections to privilege holders in grand

51

See id.
Though most Circuits conclude that in the context of grand jury secrecy “in camera
examination of the attorney [is] the most effective method of determining that the crime-fraud
exception has been established,” In re John Doe, Inc.,13 F.3d at 637, this is with the
acknowledgement of the difficulty this poses for the privilege holder because of the
impracticality of arguing against unknown evidence, effectively preventing development of an
effective defense. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1986). There, counsel
for the client-target argued that in camera review prevented them from “refut[ing] any false or
misdirected information provided….[and from placing] any grand jury testimony in the
‘appropriate business context.’” Id. at 161.
53
Haines v. Liggett, 975 F.2d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1992); and In re Napster, Inc. Copyright
Litigation, 479 F.3d 1078, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006).
52

14

jury cases,54 none has ruled that denial of an adversarial hearing to rebut the claim of crimefraud is a denial of due process in the criminal setting.55
This differential treatment, depending on whether the privilege holder is a civil litigant
or the target/subject of a grand jury in a criminal case, is best illustrated by cases decided in the
Third and Ninth Circuits. Both circuits analyzed the question of whether civil versus criminal
privilege holders are denied due process when they are not afforded the opportunity to rebut
claims of crime-fraud through the presentation of written and live evidence. Both circuits held
that in civil cases, depriving the privilege holder of the opportunity to rebut crime-fraud
allegations is a due process violation but failed to reach the same conclusion in the criminal
context.
54

Outlined in Section IV, infra. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (2d
Cir. 1977).
55
See In re Grand Jury, 223 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We today join the ranks of
our sister circuits in holding that it is within the district courts’ discretion, and not violative of
due process to rely on ex parte government affidavit to determine that the crime-fraud
exception applies and thus compel a target-client’s subpoenaed attorney to testify before the
grand jury.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 662 (10th Cir. 1998) (“‘The
determination of whether the government shows a prima facie foundation in fact for the change
which results in the subpoena lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.’”) (quoting In re
September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734, 735 (10th Cir. 1976)); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that “the district court’s in camera
proceedings did not result in a violation of the [client-target’s] due process rights.”); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Gordon), 722 F.2d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1246 (1984) (stating that in camera submissions were a “reasonable accommodation of the
need to maintain secrecy of the grand jury investigation and the need for prompt resolution of
the privilege issue); In re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir.1976)
(responding to client-target’s request for an adversary hearing rather than the ex parte in
camera review with “we find no authority which holds that such determination must be made
in an adversary hearing”); but cf. American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (where the court in a crime-fraud case held that ex parte hearings did not afford
the defendants adequate due process because “state prosecutors and their investigators had
unfettered access to extensive confidential thoughts and unguarded statements of the lawyers in
a wide array of files.”); State v. Wong, 40 P.3d 917, 922-23 (Haw. 2002) (holding that the state
may not present attorney client privileged material to grand jury under crime-fraud exception
without notice to the client and prior judicial approval). See infra Section IV, for more detailed
analysis of due process considerations in the context of the crime-fraud exception.
15

In the Third Circuit case Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., the plaintiff sued the tobacco
industry for wrongful death and sought documents from the defendant that plaintiff claimed
were the product of crime-fraud .56 After the trial court directed discovery, but before any
privileged communications had been divulged, the defense was granted a writ of mandamus.57
The Third Circuit held that in civil cases, due process is violated where the party invoking the
attorney-client privilege is not given the chance to answer allegations of crime-fraud; the party
has an “absolute right” to be heard by testimony and argument before the court conducts in
camera review of the privileged oral and written communications at issue.58
Conversely, eight years later in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the same court “join[ed]
the ranks of [its] sister circuits in holding that it is within the district courts’ discretion, and not
violative of due process, to rely on an ex parte government affidavit and thus compel a clienttarget’s subpoenaed attorney to testify before the grand jury.”59 The court distinguished its
holding in Haines from this case, where privileged communications between a target and his
lawyer were sought in the form of a grand jury subpoena, and noted the importance of the
grand jury’s investigative role and the need for secrecy in the context of an ongoing criminal

56

975 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 89-90.
58
Id. at 97. In granting the petition for mandamus, which vacated the lower court’s
finding that the crime-fraud exception applied, the Haines Court stated “[t]he importance of the
privilege, as we have discussed, as well as fundamental concepts of due process require that the
party defending the privilege be given the opportunity to be heard, by evidence and argument,
at the hearing seeking an exception to the privilege...We are concerned that the privilege be
given adequate protection, and this can be assured only when the district court undertakes a
thorough consideration of the issue, with the assistance of counsel on both sides of the
dispute.” Id.
59
223 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000).
57

16

investigation.60 The court also noted that Haines involved adversarial proceedings whereas
grand jury proceedings are investigative, explaining that “the rules of the game are different.”61
In March of 2008, the Ninth Circuit similarly held in In Re: Napster, that the party
seeking outright disclosure where crime-fraud is alleged in the civil context has the right to
introduce countervailing evidence.62 Finding Haines to be “well-reasoned” the Court
concluded that “in a civil case the party resisting an order to disclose materials allegedly
protected by the attorney-client privilege must be given the opportunity to present evidence and
argument in support of its claim of privilege.”63 However, the same court did not provide
privilege holders in criminal cases the same protections in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, and
allowed the privilege to be pierced by a prima facie showing by the prosecution without
considering contrary evidence by the defense. .64
Indeed, a review of federal civil cases demonstrates that both trial and appellate courts
go to great lengths to ensure due process protection to privilege holders in civil cases but not in
criminal cases.65 In accord with the Third and Ninth Circuits, other circuits agree that civil

60

Id. at 218.
Id.
62
In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 479 F.3d 1078, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006).
63
Id.
64
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe). 867 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1989); but see In
re Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F 3d.976, fn 8 (8th Cir. 2007) (court stated: “(w)e need
not decide today whether the district court may or should consider contrary evidence. Even if
the district court could have (or should have) accorded the countervailing evidence some
measure of consideration, we do not believe that consideration of the contrary evidence in this
case would have properly affected the district court’s crime-fraud determination. …We leave
open the possibility that, in some circumstances, weighing contrary evidence or rejecting the
government’s evidence could be warranted. There may be cases, for example, where the
government’s evidence appears so facially unreliable (or the countervailing evidence so
compelling) that a more critical gaze, perhaps informed by contrary evidence, may be
appropriate.”
65
See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. 153 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 1998) In that case, the
court held that because the case was civil rather than criminal, “the district court may not…
61
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cases are part of the adversarial process while criminal are part of an investigative proceeding
by an impaneled grand jury. While acknowledging the inherent conflict between providing the
privilege holder in the criminal setting with the opportunity to rebut claims of crime-fraud and
maintaining the integrity of grand jury proceedings, they consistently hold because grand jury
secrecy is axiomatic66 the latter trumps the former.67 However, all concur that this secrecy can
be penetrated, necessitating judicial intervention, when a “recognized privilege[] provide[s]
legitimate grounds for refusing to comply with a grand jury subpoena.”68 The attorney-client

compel production without permitting the party asserting the privilege, to present evidence and
argument.” Id. at 716. There the court remanded the case for the trial court to have an ex parte
in camera hearing to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applied to certain
documents and testimony. Further, the court made clear that the party seeking to pierce the
privilege has no legal right to insist on being present at the in camera review.
66
See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 356 U.S.677 (1958). Policies that underlie the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings include:
‘(1) [t]o prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons
subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand
jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the
commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from
disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of
standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.’
Id. at 682 n.6 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954).
67
It is true that the grand jury, as an investigative body, rather than an adversarial one,
may generally “compel the production of evidence or testimony of witnesses...unrestrained by
the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.” United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
68
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982), (recognizing that each of the
recognized privileges “is firmly anchored in a specific source-the Constitution, a statute, or the
common law.”). See also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346 (“Although courts may not interfere with
the grand jury process absent a showing of a compelling reason, the grand jury as an
investigative body is not impenetrable.”); and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)
(providing for an exception to the general rule prohibiting disclosure of grand jury testimony,
and stating in pertinent part that “(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters
occurring before the grand jury may also be made-(i) when so directed by a court preliminary
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding”) (emphasis added).
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privilege falls in that category, unless proof exists that it has been abrogated through actual
crime-fraud.
The importance of conferring additional due process rights on privilege-holders in the
context of grand jury investigations becomes clear after reviewing recent federal grand jury
history: such a review reveals that the theoretical independence of grand juries is at odds with
reality. Although established as an independent body charged with determining whether there
is probable cause to believe that “a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens
against unfounded criminal prosecutions,”69 in practice the grand jury is “an arm of the
prosecution” used to gather incriminating evidence against a target/subject.70 As such, the

69

Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343; See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)
(“Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused…to determine whether a charge is founded upon
reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.”).
70
Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590 (1961).
In practice, however, the district attorney, because of his access to information,
prestige as an important government official, and familiarity with grand jury
procedure, tends to direct the grand jury’s operations. Normally the district
attorney determines the subject matter of the investigation, and also has
considerable control over its conduct.
Id. at 596. See also United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 965 (11th Cir. 1983).
The grand jury serves as an investigative and accusatory body in collaboration
with the U.S. Attorney. Until an indictment is returned and a case presented to
the United States District Court, the responsibility for the functioning of the
grand jury is largely in the hands of the U.S. Attorney. This does not mean that
the court cannot redress abuses by the grand jury or a U.S. Attorney.
Id; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is, indeed,
common knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the
citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive.”); Seymour Glanzer, Proceedings
of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 67 F.R.D.
513, 538 (June 1975) (stating “the prosecutor and not the grand jury [] provides the only
potential protection that exists between a possible accused and the bringing of criminal
charges. The prosecutor is the central figure in the grand jury investigative process and he will
generally make prosecutive determinations and not the grand jury.”);
Further, now that the practice of issuing grand jury subpoenas has become increasingly
common, “the attorney client privilege has taken on particular significance in grand jury law.
19

prosecutor plays an increasingly prominent role in grand jury practice71 necessitating greater
protections for client-targets when their attorney-client privilege is being challenged under the
crime-fraud exception.72

The attorney client privilege therefore deserves independent attention as it applies to the efforts
of grand juries to obtain evidence through subpoenas to the attorneys of criminal suspects.”
Sarah S. Beale, et al., Annotation, Attorney-client Privilege, Grand Jury Law and Practice, §6:9
(2d Ed. 2007).
71
United States v. Ross, 412 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Realistically, federal
grand juries today provide little protection for criminal suspects whom a U.S. Attorney wishes
to indict. Nevertheless, that is not a realism to which judges are permitted to yield.”).
72
See infra Section V.
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III. RAMIFICATIONS OF COURT ORDERED DISCLOSURE
An analysis of the potentially far-reaching ramifications to the privilege-holder of a
judicial ruling of crime-fraud provides a compelling rationale for ensuring that such a finding
is based on strong evidence after the client-target had some opportunity to meet and challenge
the allegations. The goal should be to allow courts to pierce the privilege and subject clienttargets to all attendant ramifications only in situations where the privilege-holder actually
committed crime-fraud rather than innocently communicating with counsel in a manner that the
trial court erroneously construed as intentionally furthering illegal conduct.73
Under the current system, the most direct result of privilege-piercing is that a clienttarget will face indictment and mounting incriminating evidence, generated in part, by his own
lawyer, with no forum for vindication before outright disclosure of privileged
communications.74 Further, once a court concludes that the crime-fraud exception applies, “all

73

See, e.g., United States v. John Doe, No. 04-4136 11/23/05, 429 F.3d 450, 454 (3d
Cir. 2005).
The crime fraud exception… applies to any communications between an
attorney and client that are intended ‘to further a continuing or future crime or
tort.’ The privilege is not lost if the client innocently proposes an illegal course
of conduct to explore with his counsel what he may or may not do. Only when
a client knowingly seeks legal counsel to further a continuing or future crime
does the crime-fraud exception apply.
Id. (quoting In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2001)).
74
See, e.g., Ellen R. Peirce & Leonard J. Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness
for the Prosecution,: Curbing the Practice of Issuing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for
Targets of Investigation, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 821, 836 (1985). In that article, in the context of
compelling counsel to testify to nonprivileged information related to her client before the grand
jury, the author notes:
Essentially, the lawyer who is asked to produce information that might
incriminate a client is being asked to engage in conduct that is inconsistent with
the role of a totally committed advocate of the client’s interest. In this situation,
the lawyer’s roles as citizen and officer of the court, on the one hand, and the
client’s advocate, on the other hand, are in direct conflict. This conflict and the
attendant strains placed on the adversary system inevitably result whenever a
grand jury subpoenas an attorney to produce evidence about his client.
21

communications used in furtherance of crime fraud are deemed to be without privilege.”75
Obviously, the prosecution may compel testimony from counsel consisting of attorney-client
confidences before the currently empanelled grand jury.76 What is less obvious is that if that
grand jury is disbanded before indicting a target, the prosecution can use the same testimony
against the target before a second grand jury.77 Some courts have held that this is so, even after
a judge rules that the subpoena compelling testimony was improper or in error.78
If a client-target is indicted by an impaneled grand jury, based in part on crime-fraud
evidence, and the subpoena served on counsel to testify to privileged communication is later
found to be invalid or improperly issued, “there is nothing a court can do to withdraw all
knowledge or information” from those who have heard it, including the prosecution.79 Most
courts that have addressed the issue have refused to issue an injunction against a “future use of
[a]ttorney’s testimony” consisting of confidential communications with the client, again, even
where the court finds that the subpoena compelling that testimony was issued in error.80 This

Id. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, Esq. 781 F.2d 238, 261 (2d. Cir.
1986) (“The result for the subpoenaed lawyer is equally inadequate. He has the so-called
choice of either resisting disclosure with contempt possibilities-thereby risking his legal careeror resigning from the case.”).
75
Zolin, 491 U.S. 565 n.7, See e.g. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d 329, 349 n,12
th
(5 Cir. 2005) (stating that with respect to how far-reaching the exception can be, though trial
courts generally confine what is discoverable pursuant to the crime-fraud exception to
communications and documents used in furtherance of a contemplated or ongoing crime or
fraud, this does not “preclude the potential disclosure of a client’s entire file, in the proper
case, upon the proper showing of the client’s entire representation’s being in furtherance of the
alleged crime or fraud.”)
76

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 781 F.2d at 260.
In Re: Grand Jury Investigation, No. 06-1474, 445 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2006). See
also In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F. 2d 49, 62 (7th Cir.1980).
78
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 272.
79
Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992).
80
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 272. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
77
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leaves room for the anomalous situation where a client-target’s attorney-client privilege was
abrogated in contravention of his rights, but he cannot foreclose the possibility that the
prosecution will be permitted to use his oral communications with his lawyer in a future
proceeding against him.81 Nor is dismissing the grand jury that has heard the tainted evidence
“an appropriate remedy,” in circuits where the government is not precluded from using the
same testimony before a second grand jury.82
The client-target finds himself in a Catch-22 when counsel moves to quash a crimefraud subpoena without success, testifies to privileged communications before the grand jury,
then seeks on his client’s behalf to challenge the legality of the trial court’s ruling ordering
outright disclosure, either pre or post indictment. Several circuits have held that once the
lawyer has completed testifying to privileged communications, the portion of the appeal

Proceedings (John Roe), 142 F.3d 1416, 1428 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the request for
issuance of a future-use injunction because it would be unenforceable). Additionally, the D.C.
Circuit stated that
[A] party cannot retrieve testimony once it is given; the party can only ask that
the testimony be sealed against future use. In that event, such a challenge
would be ripe only at the time when that future use is a real, not a speculative,
possibility. Because appellant seeks only to seal his testimony against future
use, we find that his appeal became moot upon his compliance with the district
court’s order enforcing the subpoena.
Office of Thrift Supervision, Dep’t of Treasury v. Dobbs, 931 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted). But cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2006)
(stating the court is “not convinced that we should rule out the possibility of a future-use
injunction as a remedy,” but in this case, “we need not decide whether we will extend our
jurisprudence to the grand jury context… the potential availability of a future-use injunction
means that the issue is not moot”). See also In re Berkley & Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 548, 555 (8th
Cir. 1980) (holding that disclosure of documents was only valid as to the grand jury
proceedings, and that claims of privilege could be re-asserted at trial).
81
See Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12.
82
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 272. See also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (John Roe), 142 F.3d 1416, 1427 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissal of grand jury is not
appropriate remedy because dismissal “would not erase the attorney’s testimony from the mind
of the United States Attorney and others having access to the testimony, or the fruits thereof, to
another grand jury.”).
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challenging the trial court’s refusal to quash a subpoena to testify is moot.83 In other words,
compliance with the subpoena often precludes an appeal at this stage in the proceedings. In
these circuits, any indictment or subsequent conviction flowing, in part, from evidence
collected pursuant to the crime-fraud exception, will not be vulnerable based on misapplication
of the exception.84
In addition to undermining a client’s trust for his lawyer, a ruling abrogating the
privilege places the lawyer in a seriously compromised position.85 That attorney, who is
attempting to represent his client zealously, is put in a precarious situation when compelled to
testify to his communications with his client.86 If counsel moves to quash the subpoena,87 as is

83

See, e.g., In re Arbitration (Security Life, Ins.), 228 F.3d 865, 870 (8th Cir. 2000)
(dismissing as moot that portion of the appeal concerning the enforcement of the subpoena for
testimony). But cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Stover), 40 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir. 1994)
(differentiating between live testimony and tangible evidence like documents, holding in that
with respect to documents, the appeal is not moot because an order to return or destroy
documents would offer some relief, and partial remedies can render an appeal not moot); and
United States v. Florida Azalea Specialist, 19 F.3d 620, 622 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating the
appeal was not moot under the circumstances because even if the court held “that the subpoena
was improperly issued, Florida Azalea would be entitled to a partial remedy in the form of
return or destruction of its documents.”).
84
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Roe), 142 F.3d at 1428.
85
David S. Rudolph & Thomas K. Maher, The Attorney Subpoena: You are Hereby
Commanded to Betray your Client, 1-SPG CRIM. JUST. 15, 16 (1986).
The fragile relationship of trust, built upon the understanding that what is said to
the attorney is confidential and that the attorney’s sole function is to serve as a
zealous advocate for the client within the bounds of the law, is seriously
strained whenever the government even attempts to have the attorney act as a
witness against his client.
Id. See also Peirce, supra note 75 at 857-58 (1985) (noting that the erosion of trust between
attorney and client is “particularly destructive” if the relationship has lasted for a long time
because most likely result is the termination of the relationship, or upon testimony against the
client, disqualification).
86
Thomas K. Foster, Grand Jury Subpoenas of a Target’s Attorney: The Need for a
Preliminary Showing, 20 GA. L. REV. 747, 773-74 (1986). See also Peirce, supra note 86.
Essentially, the lawyer who is asked to produce information that might
incriminate a client is being asked to engage in conduct that is inconsistent with
the role of a totally committed advocate of the client’s interest. In this situation,
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often the case, the attorney must expend valuable resources to wage an interlocutory appeal or
file a writ of mandamus88 that would otherwise be devoted to trial preparation.89 In some

the lawyer’s roles as citizen and officer of the court, on the one hand, and the
client’s advocate, on the other hand, are in direct conflict. This conflict and the
attendant strains placed on the adversary system inevitably result whenever a
grand jury subpoenas an attorney to produce evidence about his client.
Id. at 836.
87
See, e.g., Max D. Stern & David A. Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney
Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1792-93 (1988).
88
Writs of mandamus, which allow appellate courts to compel district courts to
perform mandatory ministerial duties, are “drastic and extraordinary remed[ies].” In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 723 F.2d 1461, 1466 (10th Cir. 1983). According to the Supreme Court,
mandamus may be used as a means of reviewing disclosure orders if 1) the party seeking
issuance has no other adequate means to attain the relief sought, 2) there is a clear and
undisputable right to it, and 3) the issuing court is satisfied that the writ is appropriate under
the circumstances. United States v. West, 672 F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing, inter alia,
Kerr v. United States District Ct. for N.D. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394 (1976); Bankers Life &
Casualty Company v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, (1953); and Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S.
104 (1964). Use of mandamus as a method of appealing a district court ruling varies by circuit.
Cassandra B. Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A Suggested
Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733,751. See also Stern, supra
note 88 at 1794.
The subpoena creates intense pressure by virtue of the fact that the attorney
herself may have been threatened with, or fear, investigation. Even if she has no
reason to fear such investigation, she may wish to avoid confrontation or
publicity. She also may lack the money, energy, time, knowledge or ability to
wage the aggressive and complicated battle that subpoena litigation frequently
involves. As an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena may not be
immediately reviewable, she may hesitate to resist the subpoena and thereby
risk contempt, which she may well have to do if the client's appellate rights are
to be saved. At the same time, the subpoena constitutes an apparent legal
command to produce evidence and thus offers a convenient, if insufficient,
justification for capitulation. It presents an ideal opportunity for a prosecuting
attorney to take advantage of a compromised lawyer in order to obtain client
information.
Id.
89
Stern, supra note 88 at 1792-93. See also Rudolph, supra note 86 at 16 (“[T]he
litigation surrounding the enforcement of the subpoena may drain valuable time, energy and
money from the preparation needed for the trial itself.”); and id. at 18 (“Moreover, litigating a
motion to quash consumes time and energy, and the fact that the motion may not be successful
can deter counsel from becoming involved in cases in which a subpoena is likely.”).
25

jurisdictions, in order to ensure immediate review the lawyer must refuse to comply90 and incur
criminal contempt charges.91 Conversely, should the lawyer comply with the subpoena and
testify to client confidences before the grand jury, and a court later finds that the subpoena was
issued in error, counsel’s professional reputation may be harmed, his credibility damaged in the
eyes of current and future clients.92
Finally, once the trial court finds that the government has met its burden of proving
crime-fraud, and orders the lawyer to testify before the grand jury, an appeal by either counsel
or the client will rarely result in reversal. Courts of Appeal almost uniformly take the position
that the correct standard of review is “clear error.”93 They justify this high standard based on
their conclusion that “the application of the attorney-client privilege is a fact question to be
determined in light of the purpose of the privilege and guided by judicial precedents.”94

90

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 723 F.2d at 1465 (holding that an appeal on
a crime-fraud finding was premature because the client did not wait for her attorney to incur a
contempt citation).
91
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, Esq., 781 F.2d 238, 261 (2d Cir.
1986) (stating that an attorney does not have much of an option when faced with a subpoena:
compliance results in mandatory resignation, and resisting disclosure results in possible
contempt charges, and the corresponding professional risk).
92
Stacy Caplow, The Reluctant Witness for the Prosecution: Grand Jury Subpoenas to
Defense Counsel, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 769, 785 (1985); William J. Genego, The New Adversary,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 816 (1988).
93
See, e.g., In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2005) (reviewing
the district court’s determination of crime-fraud for clear error) (citation omitted).
94
Id. (citation omitted).
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IV. RECOGNIZED DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
To date, no court has found ex parte in camera proceedings to violate the privilege
holder’s due process rights.95 However, as set forth below, several circuits have articulated the
need to balance grand jury secrecy with protection of the relationship between a client and his
lawyer. In that vein, to varying degrees, courts of appeal have outlined procedural protections
for privilege-holders against claims of crime-fraud, particularly in cases where the
government’s interest in preserving secrecy is minimal.
A review of case law provides guidance in structuring the proposed legislation
promulgated in Section V of this article. In In re Taylor the Second Circuit held that on the
facts of that case, ex parte in camera review of government submissions violated the clienttarget’s due process rights.96 Though not a crime-fraud case, crime-fraud decisions cite Taylor
for its holding with respect to the propriety of ex parte in camera proceedings in connection
with grand jury investigations. The Taylor court reasoned that
In camera proceedings are extraordinary events in the constitutional framework
because they deprive the parties against whom they are directed of the root
requirements of due process, i.e. notice setting forth the alleged misconduct
with particularity and an opportunity for a hearing. They can only be justified
and allowed by compelling state interests. Whenever the legal rights of
individuals are to be adjudicated, the presumption is against the use of secret
proceedings.97
Of particular relevance to this article’s thesis, the Taylor court established a balancing
test, pitting grand jury secrecy against a party’s due process rights, where the determining
factor is whether the government’s need to maintain that secrecy in a given case, is actual or de
minimus. In Taylor, the client-target sought a “limited and discrete disclosure of the factual

95
96
97

See supra Section II.B.
567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir.1977).
Id. at 1187-88.
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basis for the assertion that he will be asked to incriminate his associates and that, therefore, he
requires independent legal counsel.”98 The court reasoned that the government’s need for
secrecy was temporal and that disclosure of the ex parte submissions would not pose a danger
to anyone involved in the case.99
The Second Circuit again recognized in In re John Doe, Inc., that there are cases where
ex parte in camera proceedings may “deprive[] one party to a proceeding of a full opportunity
to be heard on an issue,’ and its use is justified only by a compelling interest.” 100 Building on
the Taylor balancing test, the court stated in dicta, “where concerns for secrecy are weak, an in
camera proceeding may not be justified”101 where, for example, the party who sought access to

98

Id. at 1188. In Taylor, the government submitted an affidavit and exhibits in camera
in support of a motion to disqualify a client-target’s attorney who was scheduled to appear
before the grand jury. The motion alleged a conflict of interest as the government planned to
call the client-target as a grand jury witness after granting him immunity to testify against other
targets, where those targets were current clients of the attorney. The client-target requested a
limited opportunity to review the in camera submissions so that he could respond in a manner
that allowed him to retain his counsel, but the trial court found in favor of the government and
precluded the client-target from retaining that counsel. The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the government’s withholding of the in camera materials, constituted “compulsory
disqualification of [the attorney] as a tactical maneuver to compel [Taylor] to testify and to
prevent what it anticipates will be efforts by the [other targets] summoned for the grand jury
investigation to ‘stonewall’ the work of the grand jury.” Id. at 1187. The court further held that
the denial of access to the in camera materials effectively denied the client-target of his right to
counsel, thus violating his due process rights
99
Id. at 1187. In another Second Circuit case, however, the court limited the holding
in Taylor to situations when the government plans to reveal grand jury materials to a witness
once the witness takes the stand before that body, where the need to maintain secrecy is
consequently minimal. However the court did not suggest in this case that in camera
submissions are to be routinely accepted, instead concluding that this method is preferred in
cases where the clear alternatives are 1) sacrificing grand jury secrecy or 2) leaving the issue
[of crime-fraud] unresolved at a “critical juncture.” In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 490
(2d Cir. 1982). The following year, the court held that “although in camera submissions… are
not to be routinely accepted, an exception to this general rule may be made where an ‘ongoing
interest in grand jury secrecy’ is at stake.” Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663,
670 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
100
13 F.3d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
101
Id.
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an in camera submission was going to learn the contents of the submission immediately after
taking the stand when called as a grand jury. The court concluded that “there was no legitimate
concern for secrecy justifying an in camera examination.”102 In camera proceedings, then are
extraordinary events, not to be taken lightly, appropriate when there is a legitimate need for
secrecy.103 Where the government’s need for secrecy was slight, and disclosure of the content
of the ex parte affidavit would not pose a danger to anyone, a failure to reveal its contents
violates due process.104 The court also noted that where there is an allegation of crime-fraud in
connection with a grand jury investigation, situations may present themselves where a “judge
may perceive a special need for adversary examination and give full or limited access to the
government’s submissions.”105

102

Id. See also In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.
1980) (holding that in a case where the evidence to be revealed in seeking to pierce the
privilege is the prosecution affidavit, which did not contain any testimony elicited from grand
jury witnesses, the necessity of preserving secrecy was weak; disclosure to opposing counsel
and the privilege holder would not discourage other grand jury witnesses from testifying).
103
In re John Doe, 13 F.3d at 636 (referencing In John Doe Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 490
(2d Cir. 1982), where it had concluded that “where an in camera submission is the only way to
resolve an issue without compromising a legitimate need to preserve the secrecy of the grand
jury, it is an appropriate procedure.”).
104
See id.
105
Id. Here the factual scenario underlying the appeal stemmed from a client-target
raising a privilege claim upon learning that his former lawyer had been subpoenaed to testify
before the grand jury to answer questions about certain attorney-client communications. Id. at
635. In response to the client-target taking the position that unless the government sought and
obtained a final compulsion order from the trial court, in compliance with the procedures set
for in Zolin, the privilege remained intact, the government moved for a compulsion order and
submitted, in support, an ex parte FBI Affidavit. Id. The trial court reviewed the affidavit then
questioned former counsel in camera. Id. Before issuing a compulsion order, the judge had a
follow-up ex parte meeting with the prosecutor to determine the actual questions he would be
asking counsel in front of the grand jury. Id. Among the issues on appeal were whether
denying the client-target access to the FBI Affidavit or prohibiting him from being present
when the trial judge questioned former counsel in camera about the actual privileged
communications to determine whether the government met its burden to prove crime-fraud,
were denials of due process. Id. The court held that neither act constituted a violation of the
privilege-holder’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 635-36. The final question
29

In In re John Doe, the Second Circuit reiterated its concern that safeguards be in place to
protect the rights of the client-target privilege holder where crime-fraud is alleged and
concluded that “where concerns for secrecy are weak, an in camera proceeding may not be
justified.”106 The court concluded that should a judge perceive a special need for adversary
examination, he or she has discretion to do so in full or limited form, though no such need
presented itself in the case at issue.107
As previously outlined, the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that in the context of crimefraud allegations stemming from a grand jury investigation, ex parte in camera submissions do
not constitute a violation of due process.108 It predicated this ruling on its “confiden[ce] that the
district courts will vigorously test the factual and legal basis for any subpoena … [A] court
which questions the sufficiency of the affidavits has available various avenues of inquiry,
among them discovery, in camera inspection, additional affidavits and a hearing.”109 Thus this
court echoed the Second Circuit’s observation that in certain crime-fraud cases, an adversarial
hearing is warranted to determine whether the government has met its burden of proof to
compel disclosure of privileged communication between a client-target and his counsel.110
Without an adversarial proceeding to test the factual and legal basis for a subpoena, the Third
Circuit acknowledged that the district court’s discretion plays a pivotal role in attempting to

raised was whether denying the client-target’s current counsel the opportunity to question prior
counsel about the content of the in camera interrogation was a denial of due process, and again
the court said no. Id. at 636-37.
106
Id. at 636.
107
Id. Thus the court determined the degree of due process to be conferred on the
privilege holder is contingent on the actual need for grand jury secrecy under the specific facts
presented in given case.
108
See supra Section II.B.
109
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000).
110
See id.
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preserve grand jury secrecy while ensuring that there is no abuse of grand jury powers or the
attorney-client privilege.111
One year later, the Third Circuit again approved exclusive reliance in grand jury cases on
ex parte materials, reviewed in camera, in establishing a prima facie showing of crimefraud.112 But the court noted that an exception may lie “where there are no secrecy or
confidentiality imperatives” such that there “would seem to be no impediment to permitting the
attorney to challenge the government’s prima facie evidence.”113 The court allows discovery
and the opportunity to challenge in the civil context, and where no security concern presents
itself, the Third Circuit would permit the same in the grand jury context provided doing so does
not devolve into a “minitrial.”114
In In re Grand Jury #5,115 the Fourth Circuit adhered to its prior rulings that ex parte in
camera hearings did not violate due process.116 Nonetheless it stated that the client-target has a
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Id.
In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2001).
113
Id. at 318 n.9.
114
Id.
115
401 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2005). The court held that the trial judge abused his
discretion by finding that the crime-fraud exception applied in the context of both documents
and testimony where he conducted an in camera hearing in which the government presented
evidence ex parte, but never examined the allegedly privileged documents or testimony before
ordering the attorney to testify in the grand jury. Id. at 251 n.2.
116
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 674 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding
that the district court’s ex parte in camera hearings did not violate due process); and In re
Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept. Term, 33 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1994). In In re Thursday, the
court found no due process violation even though the district court “did not articulate the basis
for the crime or fraud that allegedly vitiates the privileges the [client-targets] have asserted,”
the privilege-holder was never apprised of which statutes or regulations he had violated
justifying piercing the privilege, and the indictments ultimately returned against the clienttarget were for mail fraud, although mail fraud “does not appear to be the basis on which the
district court applied the crime-fraud exception.” Id. at 346, 353 n.19. The Court held that
these arguments, “[h]owever appealing,” were trumped by the government’s and grand jury’s
interest in the secrecy of an ongoing investigation. Id. at 353.
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right to rebut the government’s assertions through presentation of evidence to the trial judge.117
However, the court left the privilege holder in a conundrum in a subsequent case by
recognizing that the party asserting the privilege may seek to rebut the government’s assertion
of crime-fraud by “demonstrat[ing it] has not proven its prima facie case,” but “cannot have
access to the allegations in the government’s in camera submission to do so.”118
The Sixth Circuit adhered to its sister circuits’ conclusion that in camera inspection is
not a “per se denial of due process” where a genuine conflict exists between the client-target’s
interest in discovering the content of the government’s ex parte submission and the
government’s interest in maintaining the secrecy of its grand jury investigation.119 The court’s
election of the term per se in In re Antitrust Grand Jury, coupled with the facts of the case,
where for a long time the privilege holder had notice of the basis of the government’s request
and knowledge about the grand jury investigation,120 suggests that in a case where the
government’s interest was more minimal, the court might allow disclosure to the defense of
part or all of the ex parte submissions. Even with the strong facts presented in Antitrust, the
Court of Appeals concluded that trial courts “must still closely scrutinize the [motion to pierce
the privilege] and the in camera exhibits in support of that motion.”121
The Eighth Circuit, in In re Berkley, similarly affirmed the use of in camera review of
privileged documents in a grand jury context, but nonetheless limited the issue of disclosure of
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Id. at 352. The Fourth Circuit stated that the proof must be able to “subject the
opposing party to the risk of non-persuasion if the evidence as to the disputed fact is left
unrebutted.” Id. at 353.
118
In re Grand Jury Proceedings #5, 401 F.3d 247, 251 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005).
119
In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1986).
120
Id. at 164.
121
Id. at 162.
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“crime-fraud” documents to the grand jury proceeding.122 The court made clear that claims of
privilege with respect to the same documents that the court reviewed in camera and ultimately
made available to the grand jury, could be re-asserted by the client-target at trial:
The ultimate question of the relevance and admissibility of the documents at
trial may then be determined… after all parties have had an opportunity to be
heard. The district court’s determination that there was prima facie evidence of
criminal or fraudulent activity was based solely on the documents before it. The
potential defendants have had no opportunity to challenge this evidence or to
present contrary evidence which may show events in a different light. In these
circumstances, the district court’s preliminary determination that the documents
are not privileged before the grand jury is not binding on the parties at any
subsequent trial.123
The range of due process protections provided by circuits is wide. Some courts conduct a
balancing test to determine whether the need for grand jury secrecy trumps the right of the
privilege-holder to see the government’s ex parte submission.124 If the need for secrecy is
slight, where, for example, the client-target’s lawyer will learn the content of the grand jury
materials constituting the prosecution’s crime-fraud evidence the minute he or she takes the
stand, the court may order disclosure of the affidavit. It may go further and order an
evidentiary hearing providing the privilege-holder a forum to rebut the crime-fraud
allegations.125 In that vein, some courts acknowledge that in certain circumstances, the district
court should consider countervailing evidence by the defense before determining whether the
privilege has been pierced.. 126 All circuits recognize that given the tension between preserving
grand jury secrecy and the attorney-client privilege, courts play a pivotal role in evaluating the
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In re Berkley & Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 548, 555 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id.
See, e.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1977).
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000)
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe). 867 F.2d at 539
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evidence presented, and must be scrupulous in exercising their discretion where crime-fraud is
alleged.127

127

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 219.
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V.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A) Proposed Statute Regulating Subpoenaing of Attorneys to Testify to Client Confidentialities
(A) To subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present
confidential evidence or testimony about a past or present client, a prosecutor
must, as a preliminary matter:
(1) reasonably believe that
(a) the attorney-client privilege does not protect the evidence
because of the existence of crime fraud; and
(b) the requested evidence
(i) is defined with reasonable particularity;
(ii) is confined within a sufficiently narrow scope;
(iii) is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
criminal investigation or prosecution; and
(iv) cannot be obtained from a nonprivileged source;
(2) obtain prior judicial approval for in camera inspection of the
confidential evidence/testimony at issue by making a preliminary showing
of the need for an ex parte hearing (“secrecy”) in the form of an affidavit
containing :
(a) facts demonstrating 1(a) and (b)(i-iv) above that are neither
privileged nor grand jury testimony;
(b) facts demonstrating that the client-target knew or should have
known that the intended conduct was unlawful; and
(c) a statement of if and when defense counsel, if subpoenaed to
testify, will learn the content of grand jury testimony containing
crime fraud evidence.
(B) If a judicial finding of the need for secrecy is made after the prosecutor’s
preliminary showing, then the court may order an ex parte hearing. If the court
deems that the prosecution has not established the need for secrecy, the clienttarget is entitled to, at minimum, notice of the allegations, and may be entitled to
rebut the allegations in an adversarial hearing. If the court finds that the need for
secrecy is minimal because the attorney-witness will learn of the grand jury
testimony containing crime fraud evidence upon taking the stand, there must be
an additional judicial determination of the efficacy of (1) notice to the client-target
of the allegations and (2) an adversarial hearing.
(C) In the event that a prosecutor obtains judicial approval for a subpoena, and
that subpoena is issued, that issuance is appealable as a final order.
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B. Discussion of Proposed Statute Generally
Because there is no split in the circuits on the constitutionality of ex parte in camera
hearings in crime-fraud cases, the Supreme Court is not likely to deviate from all lower
courts128 and hold that client-targets have a constitutional right to an adversary hearing in
response to grand jury subpoenas served on counsel.129 Instead, the remedies urged in this
article consist of proposed legislation directed at prosecutors and trial judges designed to
confer protection on privilege holders under the current system, assuming the continuation of
in camera proceedings under the Zolin line of cases.
The goal of this proposed statute is to implement legislation imposing uniform
regulations on prosecutors and judges,130 thereby increasing the likelihood that trial courts find
crime-fraud only where the client-target has, in fact, intentionally used counsel to further
illegal conduct.131 Put another way, uniform statutory procedures will allow compulsion orders
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See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
However, a number of academics and criminal practitioners do find the practice of
ex parte in camera proceedings in connection with the issuance of grand jury subpoenas
unconstitutional as violative of the privilege-holder’s due process rights. See, e.g., DiBiagio,
supra note 41 at (“the defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment militate
heavily in favor of subjecting the government’s factual foundation for the crime-fraud
exception to meaningful attack by the defendant”); Susan W. Crump, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Other Ethical Issues in the Corporate Context where there is Widespread Fraud
or Criminal Conduct, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 171, 181 (disfavoring the current practice because
“[a]ttorneys and their clients must often respond to government crime-fraud exception
allegations without knowing their factual basis, and the district court may make a fact intensive
determination of the applicability of the privilege based upon a partial or wholly untested
record.”).
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See Geraldine Gauthier, Note, Dangerous Liaisons: Attorney_client Privilege, the
Crime-Fraud Exception, ABA Model Rule 1.6 and Post-September 11 Counter-Terrorist
Measures, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 351 (2002) (suggesting a uniform approach to crime-fraud).
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Uniform application of procedures will help to obviate the problem the Ninth
Circuit articulated in 2006, that “[d]espite the fundamental importance and long history of the
attorney-client privilege and the crime-fraud exception, the procedures for preserving the
privilege against a crime-fraud challenge are surprisingly unclear.” In re Napster, Inc.
Copyright Litigation, 479 F.3d 1078, 1091 (9th Cir. 2006).
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only after reliable findings of crime-fraud, and where feasible, only after the privilege-holders
have been provided notice of the claims and some opportunity to meaningfully rebut them,
without unduly compromising grand jury secrecy.
Such legislation is timely because the current scheme where “uncertainty caused by the
[current] lack of uniform standards and procedures surrounding the application of the crimefraud exception leaves [that] exception vulnerable to abuse.”132 Moreover, client-targets have
few meaningful remedies once the court deems the privilege pierced and the ramifications of
disclosure can be far-reaching and draconian.133 Thus, the proper administration of justice must
ensure that the trial court finds crime-fraud only where it truly exists, rather than where there
may be an innocent explanation for suspicious communications between counsel and client.134
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Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Note, Has the Exception Outgrown the
Privilege?: Exploring the Application of the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 594.
Uncertainty as to the application of the crime fraud exception may cause a
chilling of communication between the client and [] attorney, based on the
client’s fear that privileged communications may later be exposed pursuant to a
claim that the crime-fraud exception should apply… The solution to this
problem seems to be increased uniformity in the evidentiary requirements for
successful assertion of the crime fraud exception. As long as courts continue to
adopt such widely differing formulations of the evidentiary requirement, the
uncertainty will persist, and with it, the continuing threat to the attorney-client
privilege.
Id. at 595.
133
See infra Section III.
134
See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 75, at 825.
[U]nder the special circumstances arising when an attorney is subpoenaed to
appear before a grand jury that is investigating his client, the attorney-client
relationship warrants stronger safeguards than are currently available.… the
nature of the attorney-client relationship and the problems posed by the practice
of subpoenaing the target client’s attorney require that the government justify
the intrusion into that relationship.
Id.
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C. Discussion of Section (A)
The legislation proposed in this article incorporates holdings from appellate courts
around the country into one federal statute. The first proposal requires the prosecution to
engage in the deliberative process of a preliminary written showing of the need to pierce the
attorney-client privilege where crime-fraud is suspected before issuing a subpoena on counsel
to testify in the grand jury.135 Under the current scheme, where there is no such pre-subpoena
procedure, prosecutors feel no compunction to conduct a preliminary examination of the
“quality” of their crime-fraud evidence, to justify why ex parte proceedings are necessary in
the specific case, or to determine whether to provide the privilege holder with notice of the
135

Courts have previously exercised supervisory power to require preliminary
showing before issuance of subpoena to lawyer to testify before grand jury. See generally
United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (attempting to balance the resulting
tension between the policies underlying the grand jury process and the protected attorney-client
relationship, the court used its supervisory powers to adopt regulations requiring prior judicial
approval before issuance of a subpoena both pre- and post-indictment on a target's counsel); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that in light of
the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343, that the grand jury
may generally “compel the production of evidence or testimony of witnesses…unrestrained by
the technical, procedural, and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials,” and
to prevent abuse of this process, required the government to justify a grand jury subpoena with
“some preliminary showing by affidavit that each item [being subpoenaed] is at least relevant
to an investigation being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and
is not sought primarily for another purpose.”), and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II),
507 F.2d 963,965 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975) (Seitz,C.J., concurring) (stating
that the requirement to justify a grand jury subpoena is “almost indispensable if citizens are to
be afforded minimum protection against the possible arbitrary exercise of power by a
prosecutor through use of the grand jury machinery.”) But cf . In re McNabb, 658 F.2d 211 (3d
Cir. 1981) (rejecting target’s contention that he should not be compelled to appear until after
Schofield I hearing); In re Special Grand Jury (Leon Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.
1982) (decision vacated and withdrawn when grand jury indicted target and he became
fugitive, 697 F.2d 12, en banc, and then subsequently vacated as moot) (“There is no
significant reason why a preliminary showing requirement in these circumstances would hinder
a United States Attorney’s role in a grand jury investigation. Indeed, if the United States
Attorneys are properly prepared, they will have no trouble showing that the information
requested is both relevant is both relevant and necessary to the investigation.”) In re Walsh,
623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980) (reversing decision by Chief Judge of Northern District of Illinois
that required a preliminary showing of need before issuance of attorney subpoena);
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allegations and the meaningful chance to rebut them.136 Indeed, at present the prosecution has
no incentive to provide the other side with crime-fraud evidence, even where doing so presents
no real risk of compromising grand jury secrecy and would serve the interests of justice. The
proposed legislation is designed to provide that incentive before issuing a subpoena on counsel,
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Nor do Department of Justice Internal Guidelines deter prosecutors from serving
subpoenas on lawyers compelling them to testify before grand juries.
Evidence suggests that the policy, [to get prior approval from the government
before issuing a subpoena] in fact had little impact on federal prosecutor’s
efforts to subpoena defense lawyers. During the year after it was enacted, the
Department of Justice approved 411 attorney subpoenas. During the six month
period from March 1987 through October 1987, the Department rejected only
ten requests for attorney subpoenas.
Kathy B. Weinman, Driving a Wedge Between Lawyer and Client: Federal Grand Jury
Subpoenas and IRS Summonses of Defense Attorneys, 40-Jun. B. B. J. 6, 17-18 (1996). That
policy required that a an Assistant Attorney General approve those subpoenas after verifying
that:
(1) In a criminal investigation or prosecution, there must be reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the information
sought is reasonably needed for the successful completion of the investigation
or prosecution. The subpoena must not be used to obtain peripheral or
speculative information;
(2) In a civil case, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the
information sought is reasonably necessary to the successful completion of the
litigation.
(3) All reasonable attempts to obtain the information from alternative sources
shall have proved to be unsuccessful;
(4) The reasonable need for the information must outweigh the potential adverse
effects upon the attorney-client relationship. In particular, the need for the
information must outweigh the risk that the attorney will be disqualified from
representation of the client as a result of having to testify against the client;
(5) Subpoenas shall be narrowly drawn and directed at material information
regarding a limited subject limited period of time; and
(6) The information sought shall not be protected by a valid claim of privilege.
These guidelines on the issuance of grand jury or trial subpoenas to attorneys
for information relating to the representation of clients are set forth solely for
the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not intended
to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor
do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative
prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
Department of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 9-2.161(a)(E).
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without forcing the prosecutor to reveal grand jury testimony to the client-target, thereby
jeopardizing the secrecy of a grand jury investigation.137
Under this legislative scheme, before serving a grand jury subpoena on counsel, the
prosecution must make a preliminary written showing of the need for secrecy at this stage or
during a Zolin ex parte in camera hearing to obtain a compulsion order. Rather than asserting,
in boilerplate fashion, that providing the client-target with notice of the crime-fraud allegations
before issuance of the subpoena will compromise grand jury secrecy, the prosecution must
provide non-privileged facts and arguments in support of this claimed need for secrecy.138 The
court must, in turn, make specific findings on the record as to whether secrecy is indeed
warranted. If not, the defense should be given notice of the allegations and the opportunity to
respond, either in writing or through an evidentiary hearing. If yes, then the court should allow
the subpoena to issue, followed by the Zolin two step process of reviewing the prosecutor’s
affidavit ex parte and holding an in camera review of the privileged material.
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The instant proposal suggests that federal law adopt the spirit of MASS. RULE OF
PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8(f) which requires that a prosecutor obtain judicial approval prior to
issuing a grand jury subpoena to an attorney for client related information and states in relevant
part:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall…(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or
other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless:
1) the prosecutor reasonably believes:
i) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable
privilege;
the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
investigation or prosecution; and
2) the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an opportunity for a prior
adversarial proceeding
Id. To make the statute have more direct application to factual scenarios where crime-fraud is
alleged, section (1)(i) might be modified to read “the information sought is not protected under
the attorney-client privilege because of the presence of crime-fraud.”
138
While this initial application can be ex parte, the judge should review it to decide
whether, with redactions, it should be turned over to defense counsel. If the court determines
that doing so will not compromise grand jury secrecy, the bench should order disclosure.
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The preliminary application must also provide facts and argument in support of the
prosecutor’s contention that the client-target knew or should have known that the intended
conduct was unlawful.139 Again, facts at the prosecutor’s disposal that are neither grand jury
testimony nor privileged materials should be included to substantiate the prosecution’s
contention that the client-target knowingly engaged in crime-fraud, as a predicate for the
issuance of a subpoena to compel privileged testimony or documents.
Finally, pursuant to the “sliding scale of need for secrecy” test outlined in In re
Taylor140 the prosecutor’s preliminary application to the court must indicate whether the
lawyer-witness will learn the content of the prior grand jury testimony substantiating the
charge of crime-fraud, soon after he takes the stand. If the answer is yes, and thus the necessity
of preserving grand jury secrecy is weak, then the court should determine the efficacy of
conducting an adversarial hearing. At the very least, due process requires that the privilege
holder be given notice of the crime-fraud charges.141 If the answer is no, then the court can
follow the two-step Zolin process.142
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Daily, supra note 133, at 593-94 (noting that at least one court has required the
party arguing to pierce the privilege show that the client knew or should have known that the
intended conduct be unlawful, and recommending that as a requirement in future cases).
140
In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1977).
141
See In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980)
(holding that because the only evidence to be revealed was the prosecution affidavit alleging
crime-fraud, and the affidavit contained no grand jury testimony, the necessity of preserving
secrecy was weak, and disclosure to opposing counsel and the privilege-holder would not
discourage other grand jury witnesses from testifying).
142
Through this legislation, the resulting judicial screening of the preliminary showing
by the prosecution might obviate the need for a motion to quash the subpoena by the clienttarget. Thus the burden of proof and of presenting supportive evidence will be on the party
with that evidence at its disposal, the government, rather than the client-target or attorneywitness (who is in the dark).
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D. Discussion of Section (B)
The first requirement for the trial judge is to review the affidavit submitted by the
prosecution in support of an ex parte in camera hearing to determine whether it has established
the need for secrecy. If the court determines that the need for secrecy is minimal or de
minimus, then it must decide how to proceed. One option is to conduct an evidentiary hearing
where the privilege holder will be provided notice of the crime fraud allegations and will be
provided the opportunity to rebut these claims in open court, mirroring the process in civil
cases. At the same time the court should make a judicial finding as to whether disclosing the
actual contents of the affidavit to the defense, with redactions, will compromise the integrity of
the criminal investigation. If not, then the court should order immediate disclosure, before
conducting any hearing or issuing a compulsion order.
E. Suggested Judicial Guidelines for Adjudication of the Crime-Fraud Exception
In addition to the mandatory legislation set forth above, trial courts should follow
additional procedures to safeguard the due process rights of privilege-holders when
adjudicating crime-fraud allegations. If, after review of the prosecution’s preliminary
application, the court rules that the government has met its initial burden and is permitted to
subpoena counsel to testify in the grand jury, defense counsel will undoubtedly move to quash.
If that happens the following rules procedures would safeguard due process: first, when the
court receives the prosecution’s ex parte affidavit, containing nonprivileged evidence and
argument alleging crime-fraud and makes a judicial finding that an ex parte in camera hearing
is warranted, it should nonetheless conduct an independent review of that document to
determine whether, with redactions, it can be turned over to the privilege-holder without posing
a serious threat of compromising the ongoing grand jury investigation. Though in many
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federal cases defense counsel makes a written demand for production of the prosecutor’s ex
parte crime-fraud submission,143 under this new guideline the court should review that
prosecutor’s affidavit irrespective of whether the defense has made such a demand. If the court
subsequently orders disclosure, the client-target will have the opportunity to meaningfully
address and rebut the claims, either through written submissions or an evidentiary hearing.144
Second, in those cases where defense counsel submits evidence negating the
prosecution’s claim of crime-fraud, under these new guidelines, the court should consider that
evidence before making its determination as whether the prosecution has met its burden of
proving crime-fraud. Presently, several, but not all circuits hold that the client-target has the
right to have his submission considered by the trial court before the court rules whether the
prosecution has met its burden of proof.145 This guideline will make review of defense
submissions a more uniform judicial practice.
Third, in cases where the prosecution survives the preliminary application phase of
crime-fraud litigation outlined above, the court should not rule on whether the prosecution has
met its burden of proving crime-fraud without reviewing the actual privileged communication
at issue. Most courts that have addressed the issue of whether the prosecution can meet its
burden of proving crime fraud through an affidavit alone, have determined that the best
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See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 223 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000) (where the target of a grand
jury requested access to the government’s ex parte submission establishing the applicability of
the crime-fraud exception).
144
If the court has concerns in a particular case that a full evidentiary hearing will
constitute a “mini-trial,” it may restrict the defense to responding to the claim through
submission of its own ex parte affidavit and documents countering the claim of crime-fraud.
145
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding #5, 401 F.3d 247, 253-55 (4th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the district court’s failure to review allegedly privileged documents in camera
before determining whether the crime-fraud exception applied constituted an abuse of
discretion).
43

practice to ensure due process is an in camera review of additional supporting evidence,
including that privileged communication.146
Finally, in cases where the trial court holds an ex parte in camera review of privileged
documents and testimony, finds that the prosecution has met its burden of proving crime-fraud,
and orders counsel to testify before the grand jury, that judge should make a concerted effort to
transfer the case to another judge for trial. That way, the presiding trial judge will not be in the
position of having reviewed privileged communications between defense counsel and the
defendant when making legal rulings at trial. Transferring the case will help the court maintain
the appearance of propriety and will serve the interests of justice.147
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See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 2001)
(noting that it could not find any case in which the Eighth Circuit had affirmed a production
order for documents under the crime-fraud exception when the lower court had not first
reviewed the allegedly privileged documents in camera); and In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d 155, 168 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the district court plainly erred when it ruled that the
government established prima facie crime-fraud and ordered the production of documents,
when it had never examined those documents in camera). According to the Supreme Court, in
camera review of allegedly privileged documents is an inexpensive and effective way to
balance competing interests of privilege and the need for documents. Kerr v. United States
District Ct. for N.D. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1976).
147
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Decker, 606 N.E.2d 1094, 1107 (Ill. 1992) (noting that
after an initial prima facie determination of crime-fraud has been made, “it would be prudent,
where possible, to have another trial judge conduct the in camera inspection once the initial
threshold has been met and the court has determined that an in camera inspection is proper.”)
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VI. CONCLUSION

The fair administration of justice requires the abrogation of the attorney-client privilege
when a client-target uses counsel to facilitate crime or fraud. A client-target should not be
rewarded or protected where he used his lawyer illegally. Yet the extremely draconian
consequence of compelling a lawyer to testify to client confidences, thereby effectively
abrogating the attorney-client relationship, should occur only where the facts warrant it.
Through legislation that arms the privilege holder with additional due process protections, the
hope is to address and resolve problems presented by a procedural world where ex parte in
camera hearings are the rule and not the exception. The legislative imposition of procedural
requirements on the government and the bench that are neither unduly burdensome, nor
conflict with current federal case law, will provide the privilege holder a real chance of
defending against specious crime-fraud allegations without thwarting the integrity and
importance of grand jury secrecy. The proposed legislation imposes rules to be followed by
prosecutors and judges in all crime-fraud cases, thereby realigning the grand jury process to
once again protect as well as investigate.
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